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Abstract. Machine learning is becoming increasingly popular in a va-
riety of modern technology. However, research has demonstrated that
machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples in their
inputs. Potential attacks include poisoning datasets by perturbing input
samples to mislead a machine learning model into producing undesirable
results. Such perturbations are often subtle and imperceptible from a hu-
man’s perspective. This paper investigates two methods of verifying the
visual fidelity of image based datasets by detecting perturbations made
to the data using QR codes. In the first method, a verification string is
stored for each image in a dataset. These verification strings can be used
to determine whether an image in the dataset has been perturbed. In
the second method, only a single verification string stored and is used to
verify whether an entire dataset is intact.
Keywords: Adversarial machine learning; cyber security; QR code; visual fi-
delity; watermarking
1 Introduction
The popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has rapidly grown in recent years, and
it has made its way into a variety of modern technology. ML techniques empower
a range of diverse applications, including self-driving cars, network intrusion
detection, speech recognition, and so on. However, research has demonstrated
that ML models are vulnerable to adversarial examples in its inputs. The purpose
of this is to use malicious inputs to fool a ML model into producing erroneous
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outputs [18]. This has given rise to a research field known as adversarial machine
learning [3].
There are a number of different adversarial attacks that can be deployed
against ML, for example, an adversary can poison a dataset by perturbing sam-
ples in the training data [3]. Over the years, researchers have examined and
demonstrated the effectiveness of such poisoning attacks [2, 19, 23]. Adversarial
attacks are a serious threat to the success of ML in practice, as small and subtle
perturbations in the inputs can mislead a ML model into outputting incorrect
predictions. In computer vision, such perturbations are often imperceptible to
the human visual system [1].
This paper focuses on protecting image based datasets by verifying the vi-
sual fidelity of the data. Due to the ML necessity of requiring large amounts of
training data, many ML models are trained using public datasets that are freely
available online. These public datasets are often copied and distributed with-
out any mechanism for protecting the integrity of the data. This makes these
datasets vulnerable to alterations by an adversary.
To address this problem, this paper investigates two methods of verifying
the visual fidelity of image based datasets by detecting perturbations in the
data using QR codes. The advantage of the proposed methods is that a copy of
the original dataset does not have to be used for verification. In the first method,
a verification string is generated for each image in a dataset using a QR code.
The size of a verification string is much smaller than the original image, and it
can be used to verify the visual fidelity of the image. To verify image fidelity, a
verification process is used to recover a QR code for each image. If the QR code
is noisy or cannot be recovered using this verification process, this means that
the dataset has been altered.
However, since this method requires a verification string for each image in a
dataset, the storage requirement increases linearly with the number of images.
While this is fine if storage space is not an issue, it may not be an attractive so-
lution for applications with limited storage capacity. Therefore, a second method
is proposed where only a single verification string is required, and can be used
to verify the fidelity of images in an entire dataset. The limitation of the sec-
ond method is that one cannot determine whether individual images have been
altered, but only whether the dataset is intact or has been altered from the
original.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the problem of protecting im-
age based ML datasets against alteration by an adversary. The proposed methods
attempt to provide mechanisms for verifying the visual fidelity of images in a
dataset without the need to use the original dataset. To do this, we generate
verification strings from the visual contents of the images and associate these
with QR codes. The reason for using QR codes is due to its inherent data capac-
ity and error correction properties, which are in-built in the QR code structure.
We present two methods for creating verification strings and for verifying the
fidelity of images. The advantage of the first method, which we named the Linear
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Verification String (LVS) method, is that the fidelity of each image can be veri-
fied individually. However, this comes at the cost of higher storage requirements.
The advantage of the second method, which we named the Aggregate Verifica-
tion String (AVS) method, is that only a single verification string is required to
determine whether an entire dataset is intact. Nevertheless, it does not allow for
one to determine the visual fidelity of individual images.
2 Background
The proposed methods are based on several concepts, including the QR code
structure, the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), the Arnold transform and
trapdoor permutation. This section presents a brief background to these concepts
followed by a description of related work.
2.1 Preliminaries
QR Code. The Quick Response (QR) code is a two-dimensional (2D) bar-
code, which was invented by the company Denso Wave [7]. The purpose of using
the QR code in this study is because the QR code structure has an inherent
error correction mechanism. This mechanism enables QR codes to be correctly
decoded even if part of it is corrupted.
A QR code is made up of light and dark modules, which are organized into
function patterns and an encoding region [11]. The size and data capacity of a
QR code is determined by its version and error correction level. There are forty
different QR code versions and four error correction levels. These error correction
levels are L (low), M (medium), Q (quartile) and H (high); these correspond to
error tolerances of approximately 7%, 15%, 25% and 30%, respectively.
DWT. The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is a transform domain tech-
nique that is widely used in signal processing. For 2D images, it involves decom-
posing an image into frequency channels of constant bandwidth on a logarithmic
scale [17]. An image is decomposed into four sub-bands, which are labeled LL
(low-low), LH (low-high), HL (high-low) and HH (high-high). Sub-bands can
be further decomposed and this process can continue until the desired number
of levels is achieved. A depiction of how an image can be decomposed into two
levels of DWT sub-bands is shown in Fig. 1. The LL sub-band contains most
of the information of the original image [16]. As such, it represents the highest
visual fidelity of an image, as the human visual system is more sensitive to its
contents. Data from the LL2 sub-band was used in experiments conducted in
this study.
Arnold transform. Adjacent pixels in images have a strong correlation to
each other. The Arnold transform, shown in Eq. 1, is a invertible transform that
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Fig. 1. Sub-bands of a two-level DWT.
can be used to disrupt the correlation between adjacent pixels [10]. An origi-
nal image that undergoes a number of Arnold transform iterations results in
a chaotic image. The reason for using this transform in this study is because
image perturbations introduce noise to an image. Applying the Arnold trans-
form to an image scrambles the pixels, and thus, scatters noise over the image.














Trapdoor permutation. Let D be a finite set. A permutation family Π over
D specifies a randomized algorithm for generating (descriptions of) a permu-
tation and its inverse, denoted as (s, t)
R←− Generate; an evaluation algorithm
Evaluate(s, ·); and an inversion algorithm Invert(t, ·). We require that for all
(s, t) produced by the algorithm Generate, Evaluate(s, ·) be a permutation of
D and Invert(t, Evaluate(s, ·)) be the identity map. A trapdoor permutation
family is one way if it is hard to invert, given just the forward permutation de-
scription s. Formally, a trapdoor permutation family is (t, ϵ)-one way if no t-time





x = A(s,Evaluate(s, x)) : (s, t) R←− Generate, x R←− D
]
,
where the probability is over the coin tosses of Generate and A.
2.2 Related Work
Researchers have previously proposed the use of QR codes for various applica-
tions in computer security. For example, for storing private and public informa-
tion [22], secret sharing [5], visual cryptography [9], digital watermarking [6] and
so on.
The methods proposed in this paper are related to zero-based watermarking.
Unlike traditional watermarking techniques, which necessitates that a water-
mark be embedded within an image, zero-based approaches do not require the
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embedding of a watermark [12]. Liu and Yan [16] proposed a secret sharing
scheme based on zero watermarking. In their approach, the watermark was not
embedded within images, but rather cover images are used to create shares that
are distributed to participants and one which is registered with a certification
authority.
In addition, QR codes have previously been used in conjunction with wa-
termarking. For instance, a watermarking scheme based on the combination of
discrete cosine transform, QR codes and chaotic theory was proposed by Kang
et al. [13]. In other work, a digital rights management technique for protecting
documents by repeatedly inserting a QR code into the DWT sub-band of a doc-
ument was investigated [4]. Various other QR code watermarking approaches
have also been proposed [6, 14, 21].
Zero-based watermarking scheme using QR codes have also been proposed.
As an example, an authentication method for medical images using zero wa-
termarking and QR codes was devised. In this scheme, a patient’s identification
details and a link their data was encoded in the form of a QR code that serves as
the watermark [20]. Similarly, Li et al. [15] proposed a QR code based zero wa-
termarking scheme in conjunction with visual cryptography for authenticating
identification photos.
3 Proposed Methods
Two proposed methods are described in this section. The first method allows
for the verification of each image in a dataset. It provides a mechanism whereby
a user can check whether individual images in a dataset have been perturbed.
However, the first method comes at a cost of storing a verification string for each
image. This may not be an appealing solution in situations where limited storage
space is an issue. As such, the second method has a very low storage require-
ment, and provides a mechanism to verify whether an entire dataset is intact.
Nevertheless, in the second method, while a user can determine if a dataset is
not intact, the user cannot identify which of the images have been altered.
3.1 Method 1 - Linear Verification String (LVS) method
The notion behind this method is to generate a verification string for each image
in a dataset. Hence, we call it the Linear Verification String (LVS) method. The
purpose of a verification string is to be able to ascertain whether an image has
been altered from the original image. An advantage of generating a verification
string is so that images in a dataset do not have to be compared with their
respective original image. Moreover, the verification strings will require much
less storage space when compared with the entire image dataset.
The motivation behind this approach is based on zero-based image water-
marking [16]. Unlike traditional watermarking techniques that requires a water-
mark to be embedded within an image, zero-based approaches do not alter the
image. This is in line with the objective of the proposed approach, which is to
detect whether samples in a dataset have been altered.
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Generating Verification Strings. Fig. 2 gives an overview of the process
used to generate verification strings for all the images in a dataset. It can be seen
from the figure that to create the verification strings, a QR code that contains
the secret message, S, and a key, K, for encryption is required. K is a random
bit string, which can be generated in a number of different ways, for example,
by using a pseudorandom number generator or by using the hash of a password.
Encryption involves performing S ⊕K for all modules in S. As such, the length
of K must equal the number of modules in S. For instance, a QR code version 1
which consists of 21× 21 modules requires the key to contain 441 random bits.
Fig. 2. Overview of the process to generate a verification string for each image in a
dataset.
The purpose of performing encryption is so that an adversary will not be
able to obtain any information about S from the verification strings. Arnold
transform will then be performed on the encrypted secret, SE , to scramble the
pixels. The reason for doing this is to scatter any noise that may result from
perturbations to an image over the entire image. The scrambled secret, ST , will
be used for creating the verification strings. Note from Fig. 2 that the same ST
can be used for all images, as this will avoid the necessity of having to generate
multiple QR code messages and keys.
Each image in the dataset then undergoes the same process. Each image
is decomposed into DWT components at the desired level, level 2 DWT was
used in experiments in this paper. Note that color images will first have to be
converted to greyscale. The LL sub-band, which represents the highest visual
fidelity, will be binarized using a dithering process. The objective of dithering is
to binarize the image into black and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s), while maintaining
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the average grey level distribution. In the experiments, we adopted the Floyd-
Steinberg dithering technique, an approach that is based on error diffusion [8].
After the dithering process, each image is upsampled using nearest neighbor
sampling to match the size of ST . The upsampling process is the reason why S
can be of any size. Finally, a verification string, Vi, is produced for each image
in the dataset by XORing ST with the dithered and upsampled results.
The details of an algorithm to generate verification strings for all images in a
dataset is provided in Algorithm 1. Inputs to the algorithm are a secret QR code,
S, an encryption key, K, and all images in a dataset. The algorithm outputs a
verification string for each image in the dataset.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for generating verification strings.
Input: A QR code, S, a key, K, and images in a dataset, Ii, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Verification strings, Vi, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
Step 1. Encrypt information in S by XORing the random bits inK with the modules
in S to produce SE .
Step 2. Generate a chaotic image ST by scrambling the bits in SE using Arnold
transform for a number of iterations.
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 3. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 4. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 5. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black and
white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 6. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match the size of
ST .
Step 7. Generate the verification string Vi using IDi ⊕ ST .
Verifying Image Fidelity. The verification strings can be used to verify the
visual fidelity of images in the dataset, and to determine whether any of the
images were perturbed. An overview of this process is depicted in Fig. 3. Similar
to the process of generating verification strings, each image in the dataset is
decomposed into DWT components. The LL sub-band at the pre-determined
level is dithered and upsampled using nearest neighbor sampling to match the
size of the verification string. Each pair of these are XORed, i.e. Vi ⊕ IDi, to
produce S′Ti. Note that if an image was perturbed, S
′
Ti ̸= ST for that image.
To recover the QR code, Arnold transform is inversed and K is used for
decryption to produce a recovered QR code for each image, SRi. If no images in
the dataset were altered, the QR code can be recovered perfectly for all images in
the dataset. However, if an image was perturbed, SRi for that image will result
in a noisy QR code.
Algorithm 2 details the steps involved in verifying the fidelity of images in
a dataset. The required inputs to the algorithm are the key, K, that was used
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Fig. 3. Overview of the process to verify each image in a dataset.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for verifying image fidelity.
Input: The key, K, verification strings, Vi, and images in a dataset, Ii, where i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Recovered QR codes, S′Ri, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 1. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 2. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 3. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black and
white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 4. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match the size of
ST .
Step 5. Generate S′Ti using Vi ⊕ IDi.
Step 6. Inverse the Arnold transform on S′Ti to produce S
′
Ei.
Step 7. Decrypt S′Ei using K to recover the QR code, SRi.
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for encryption, the verification strings and the images in the dataset. For each
image in the dataset, the algorithm outputs the recovered QR code. The visual
fidelity of each image can be determined based on whether the resulting SRi is
a clean or a noisy QR code. If SRi is noisy, a clean reconstructed the QR code
can be obtained by averaging the black and white pixels per module. If there
are more white pixels, the module should be white, and vice versa.
3.2 Method 2 - Aggregate Verification String (AVS) method
The main drawback of the previously described LVS method, is its requirement
to have to store the verification strings of all images in a dataset. Storage re-
quirements are proportional to the number of images in the dataset. While the
LVS method may seem impractical, it can be used to independently identify
any alteration in an individual image Ii, because the verification string Vi must
be stored. Hence, when storage space is not an issue (such as the use of cloud
storage), this method is feasible and attractive.
In our second method, we address the storage space issue, and aim to reduce
its size to a single verification string. In addition, we make use of trapdoor
permutation (which can be implemented using an RSA algorithm for example)
and a one way hash function, to provide additional layers of security.
Fig. 4. Overview of the AVS method.
An overview of the AVS method is depicted in Figure 4, and the algorithm is
detailed in Algorithm 3. The initial process is similar to the LVS method. After
the dithering process, we obtain IDi, which will be XORed with the key Ki and
the QR code S. Hence, IEi ← S ⊕Ki ⊕ IDi. However, unlike the LVS method,
Ki
R−→ Evaluate(s, ·), where the input of the Evaluate algorithm is obtained
from the hash value of the IE(i−1), which is the output of IEi from the previous
image block. For the first image block, we can use the initial string, such as the
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hash value of S or any other initial vector. With this chained mechanism, the
final output block will only comprise of a single verification string, V , regardless
the number of images involved.
Algorithm 3 AVS algorithm.
Input: A QR code, S, the first key, K1, and images in a dataset, Ii, where i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: A verification string, V
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 1. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 2. Extract the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 3. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black and
white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 4. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match the size of
S.
Step 5. Generate IEi using S ⊕Ki ⊕ IDi. If i ̸= 1, Ki = hash(IE(i−1)).
For the last image, In, output the verification string, V = IEn.
Furthermore, as we use trapdoor permutation in the construction, the veri-
fication will require the use of the Invert(t, ·) algorithm, which cannot be exe-
cuted without the value of the trapdoor. Therefore, when verifying the images
in a dataset, if the QR code cannot correctly be recovered at any image block,
this means that the image has been altered and the dataset is not intact. On the
other hand, if the QR code can be recovered in all image blocks, the dataset is
completely intact.
In summary, to highlight the differences between LVS and AVS, we have
achieved a constant size output regardless the number of the image blocks in
AVS. Furthermore, we enhance the security level from incorporating a symmetric
encryption scheme in LVS with a trapdoor permutation algorithm in AVS.
4 Results and Discussion
An implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2 was implemented using the OpenCV
library. This was tested using a number of test images. Fig. 5 and 6 show exam-
ples of results obtained from the experiments. Additional results can be found
in Fig. 7 and 8 in the Appendix section of this paper.
Fig. 5(a) shows an example of S, i.e. a QR code containing a secret message.
The QR code is of version 3, which contains 29× 29 modules, with error correc-
tion level H. An example of S after encryption, i.e. SE , is shown in Fig. 5(b).
Fig. 5(c) was produced by scrambling the bits in SE using Arnold transform
to generate ST . Note that in line with Algorithm 1, the same ST was used in
the experiment to obtain the results shown in Fig. 6, 7 and 8. The test images
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Example of S, SE and ST (a) QR code containing secret messge; (b) encrypted




Fig. 6. Example results for the ‘lena’ image (a) input image; (b) dithered LL2 sub-
band; (c) visual depiction of the verification string; (d) SR after JPEG compression;
(e) SR after noise; (f) SR after blurring; (g) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 6(d); (h)
reconstructed QR code from Fig. 6(e); (i) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 6(f).
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were commonly used image processing test images; namely, the lena, peppers
and mandrill images, respectively.
Results on the lena image are provided in Fig. 6. Fig. 6(a) shows the input
image, I. In Fig. 6(b), the LL2 sub-band of Fig. 6(a) was dithered and the result
was upsampled to match the size of ST . A visual depiction of the verification
string, V , that was generated as a result of XORing all bits in ID with all bits
in ST is shown in Fig. 6(a). Note that this is stored as a bit string rather than
as an image to conserve memory storage requirements.
The test image was then perturbed using three common techniques; namely,
JPEG compression, noise and blurring. For JPEG compression, OpenCV JPEG
compression with a value of 95% quality was used. Fig. 6(d) shows the result of
using the verification string to recover the QR code from the JPEG compressed
image. Fig. 6(g) in turn shows a clean QR code that was reconstructed from SR
shown in Fig. 6(d), the grey modules indicate incorrect modules in the recon-
struction. To test perturbations resulting from noise, 5 random pixels in the test
image were altered. Fig. 6(e) and Fig. 6(h) show the recovered QR code and a
reconstructed version, respectively. For the blurring test, Gaussian blurring was
used with σ = 0.5. The recovered QR code after blurring and the reconstructed
versions are shown in Fig. 6(f) and Fig. 6(i), respectively. Similar experiments
using other test images are provided in the Appendix.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the problem of protecting image based ML datasets
against alteration by an adversary. Two methods are presented in this paper;
namely, the Linear Verification String (LVS) method and the Aggregate Ver-
ification String (AVS) method. The purpose of these methods is to provide a
mechanism for verifying the visual fidelity of images in a dataset without the
need to use the original dataset. In both methods, we generate verification strings
from the visual contents of the images and associate these with QR codes. In
the LVS method, a verification string is generated for each image in a dataset.
For verification, a verification process is used whereby each verification string is
used to verify the visual fidelity of individual images in the dataset. However, the
drawback of the LVS method is that the storage requirement increases linearly
with the number of images in a dataset. To solve this problem, we proposed the
AVS method which only requires the use of a single verification string to verify
whether an entire image dataset is intact. Nonetheless, in the AVS method, one
can only ascertain whether the dataset has been altered, but cannot determine
the visual fidelity of individual images.
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Fig. 7. Example results for ‘peppers’ image (a) input image; (b) dithered LL2 sub-
band; (c) visual depiction of the verification string; (d) SR after JPEG compression;
(e) SR after noise; (f) SR after blurring; (g) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 7(d); (h)
reconstructed QR code from Fig. 7(e); (i) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 7(f).




Fig. 8. Example results for ‘mandrill’ image (a) input image; (b) dithered LL2 sub-
band; (c) visual depiction of the verification string; (d) SR after JPEG compression;
(e) SR after noise; (f) SR after blurring; (g) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 8(d); (h)
reconstructed QR code from Fig. 8(e); (i) reconstructed QR code from Fig. 8(f).
